Hermeneutics and Erotics
[[DRAFT]]
In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art.
"In place of . . . "
Literally, a total re-"place"-ment of one thing with another: Get rid of one thing, completely. In its place, some other thing, in its entirety.
(What is the "place" of "hermeneutics?")
(It's place is in what, exactly? Why? To do what?)
Replacement, although total, imposes an essential conceptual opposition only in terms of its own stipulated totality, i.e. as a consequence of itself. Meanwhile, in the conceptual content of "hermeneutics" and "erotics," there is not necessarily any opposition, or any particular opposition, just because Susan Sontag, writing in 1964, has proposed to put one "in place of" the other. That does not (yet) bespeak a conceptual opposition. It is just a prescription: "we need" to put the second thing "in place of" the first.
Obviously, if the prescription is actually to be considered, it will be necessary to try to say what can be said about it, both analytically and pragmatically.
Ostensibly some conceptual opposition can be found between "hermeneutics" and "erotics," if that is what "we" are out for, so long as it is agreed that these are not identical concepts. Still, any such opposition has nothing to do with with Sontag's proposal. Anyone can propose the practice of replacement, and can specify the objects of replacement. Such persons do not need to have in mind two conceptual objects which really are interchangeable, in any particular way. A good proposal does not create interchangeability, just as a poor proposal does not eliminate it.
What effect does such a proposal have the implicated concepts, if it has any such effect? Such a proposal speaks into existence a conflict of competing interests, a pragmatic antinomy. It cannot similarly create a conceptual or analytic antinomy out of thin air. Total replacement may be practiced, it may find its practitioners and they its objects, but it does not immediately metastasize into the semantics of those objects; it does not travel back in time to alter what these objects meant prior to the proposal (prior to the achieved practice of replacement).
(If the matter at hand is in any way important, perhaps it is inevitable that the mere fact of replacement does, later, ramify into semantic content. e.g. Once Sontag's proposed replacement is made, "erotics" becomes "the thing that replaced hermeneutics back in 1965." There is an unbounded infinitude of things that could mean, besides what it says. That, however, is a problem of foresight and hindsight. When it comes time to decide whether or not such a proposal is comprehensible, sensible, coherent, workable, and so on, there is only so much of this work for history and prophecy to do. Probably the bulk of the work ought to be done by philosophy, living or dead, analytic or pragmatic, exalted or homely; although that is almost never how such things really are handled.)
(Of course Sontag's proposed replacement has not happened. It probably never will happen, even though it is a very good idea. Perhaps it cannot actually happen and is therefore a bad idea in practice (pragmatically), in one sense at least, even if it is a good one in theory (conceptually). The ultimate aim here is to say precisely why this should be, and then to say what (if anything) is to be done about this. In any case, such a proposal cannot serve as a pragmatic case study if it has not happened at all. That is mere prophecy. Much more can be done, and done more coherently ad praesens, by way of conceptual analysis. Beyond that, Sontag's proposal does not await its own hegemony in order to be tinkered with. Perhaps the very nature of such a proposal is to be aspirationally hegemonic; that certainly seems to be the case here. Still, there have not been very many true hermeneuts nor true erotists ever to walk the earth; and again, it is beyond spurious to allow Sontag's famous essay to speak anathema into existence where there may be mere competing interests or differences of degree. No mere earthly proposal creates a cosmic clash. But what are the interests? What are the differences? It is necessary to be able to say what they are if the proposal is to be evaluated rather than merely talked through and talked past. It must not be analyzed to death, so to speak: conceptual lysis must not go the way of the cellular kind. But most of what Sontag is saying does not have to be merely guessed at, or shot at. Just try it sometime, or just think of what would be involved in doing so. And if any of that proves impossible, ask why that should be. Analyze that. Anyone can do this much. Perhaps this is not even philosophy, but it advances the problem to the point where it can be profitably confronted; to the point where communities can make the right thing of it, rather than every individual making of it what they may. That is all that is sought here. It matters only that it is achieved, not how it is achieved.)
"In place of" already suggests one axis along which there is no antinomy: If two things well and truly can occupy the same place (leaving aside for now what that even means), then already this joint ability-to-occupy just is a common property; or at least this is entailed by such a proposal, necessarily, if only implicitly. Short of the proposal ascending to hegemony, of course, there is only one other way to find out if this is indeed the case.
(How to decide whether this implied common property is
real?
And what would
that
would even mean?)
Almost certainly the place-to-be-occupied here is the place of some practice. This pin-drop is pragmatic; it is not principled; not analytic. Neither foresight nor hindsight are at issue: this is a matter of contemporary practice, now an absolutely literal compound term rather than a mere transactional codeword.
To assume its place, to be a suitable replacement, the practice has to work. That is all. It does not have to be conceptually coherent or ethically pristine. It just has to work, and so its practitioners must decide (stipulate) what it means for something to work. This is at root a judgment of value, a value judgment. Very literally so, and (this time) in every other sense also.
(Is moral pluralism a truly viable lifeway? An underlying assumption of this study is that it is not, although it would be very nice if it was. That question lurks over everything here and cannot be put off forever. It is necessarily put off for the moment.)
For now, proceeding inductively (throwing darts), pick a value-orientation for "erotics" that seems likely to enable a determination of either "it works" or "it doesn't work" in respect to some practice that prima facie belongs to the "erotics" domain. Be sporting about it, for now. e.g. For instance, say that a practice of "erotics" works if "each partner gets off," and if not then it does not work. Then say that no one gets off on "hermeneutics." (Just say.) In that case, "hermeneutics" doesn't work as "erotics." There would then be at least one true conceptual opposition between the two practice-concepts insofar as someone, somewhere, has actually proposed to replace the one with the other. (Perish the thought.) Perhaps the conceptual opposition is not total; perhaps the pragmatic opposition is not irreconcilable. There is an opposition, that is all; and yes, it seems substantial.
All of this as it is, nota bene: If no one ever proposes that "we need" to make the replacement, then none of this ever matters at all. The fact of this does not seem too important, but it seems like it could become important. File it away, for now.
Moreover, nota bene: The "opposition" is wholly determined by the value-orientation. If "erotics" were to be valued instead as, say, a vehicle of self-knowledge, suddenly there is a more obvious possibility of coherent conceptual overlap with "hermeneutics," and therefore of actual re-"place"-ment of the former by the latter. (Perish the thought, again, just to be safe.)
(This only begins to suggest just how much more is riding on value judgment than moral pluralists would like to acknowledge.)
In examples such as the above, presumably the stipulated value orientation should have something to do, somehow, with the analytic concept to which it is thereby attached.
Getting off
is
prima facie
more central to "erotics" than is
self-knowledge,
but only a sociopath or an asexual could plausibly deny the latter entirely.
It is unclear, however, that a left-field value, say
economic prosperity,
really serves the example any less ably. The mere specification of a value orientation seems to be crucial, regardless of what it is; resonance of the value orientation with the analytic concept does not seem to effect the final determination. Say that "erotics"
works
if the national economy is growing, or if the person
getting off
becomes a bit richer, literally, with each expenditure; say that some sufficiently robust empirical connection can be established, somehow; these remain strange things to say, if not actually
dangerous ideologies.
(And if the latter, that is for reasons quite far afield of the present discussion.) The point is, nonetheless: If the empirical connection is sufficiently robust, then it is simple to say
Yes
or
No
to the question,
"Does it work?"
If it is just this robustly established that the economy grows whenever "erotics" are
working,
then an economic downturn necessarily raises one uncomfortable question or the other.
What about replacement vice versa? It remains to be said what might work as "hermeneutics," so the conclusion that "hermeneutics" cannot work as "erotics" says nothing about the reverse.
What about it, then? This
is
Sontag's proposal, and it is a very good one. So, having sufficiently toyed with hypotheticals, it is time to introduce particulars; ideally the ones which really are implicated in the proposal.
When it comes to "hermeneutics" there are a handful of canonical value orientations to choose from: heightening appreciation; revealing hidden meaning or intent; situating an artwork in its context; and who knows what others.
Sontag of course does not quite see the "value" in "hermeneutics" (interpretation). That is most of her point. So, what is above called a "value orientation" may just be an "orientation" whose "value" is precisely what is contested. This is a long way of saying very little. The important part is this: Sontag, for example, says that the practice of "interpretation" originates not in a value per se but in a dilemma:
for some reason a text has become unacceptable, yet it cannot be discarded.
There are "values" implicated here, certainly. Probably there are two values that are particularly important in any such scenario: "unacceptable" marks one of them, "cannot be discarded" the other. e.g. Death by stoning is "unacceptable" in most contemporary "value" systems, but some of the groups who hold these values "cannot" just yet afford to "discard" the Old Testament. Call the anti-stoning value compassion and the pro-Old Testament value devoutness. These are the sorts of values implicated in the problematic of an "unacceptable text;" but, nota bene, they are not what is here called the "value orientation" of the problematic of interpretation. Oddly enough (it is the fault of the present analysis that this appears odd, not a fault of Sontag's writing), the "value orientation" of the interpretation problematic is marked by the word "cannot" and by then it matters not what (non)words may or may not follow it. The word that marks it is barely a word at all, yet it does mark, for present purposes, the crucially determinative "value orientation."
With this example Sontag is saying that the standard for whether or not the practice of "hermeneutics" (interpretation) has worked is whether or not it has permitted an "unacceptable text" to be salvaged rather than "discarded."
(What is the analytic opposite of "discarded?" "Preserved" is not quite right, nor is "retained." "Salvaged" is a consequentialist locution, but it will do for now.)
Now, once again prima facie but very persistently so, there seems to be no coherent analysis of "erotics" which could pragmatically justify putting it "in place of" the above-described practice of "salvage." If nothing else, the latter is just incredibly specific and ephemeral, whereas "erotics" arguably is an abiding and timeless human problem. (And Sontag has dared to suggest that it ought to occupy more territory even than this!) So, in at least that general respect it seems that it would be difficult to analyze a single common property out of "salvage" and "erotics," or at least a property which is salient to any known human concern. Hence the value orientation: "salvage" seems not actually to mark Sontag's object of replacement. Perhaps she has another in mind. Perhaps this other is
the contemporary zeal for the project of interpretation,
a "project" which
is often prompted not by piety toward the troublesome text . . . but by an open aggressiveness, an overt contempt for appearances. . . . The modern style of interpretation excavates, and as it excavates, destroys . . .
Here the prospect of re-"place"-ment by "erotics" can be coaxed out of the relevant analytic concepts. It is not easy to do (such a thing never is). Presume for now that it can be done. (Keep in mind that the alternative is another sprawling paragraph attempting to actually do it. That should be enough.)
So,
In "place" of "aggressiveness," love.
In "place" of "contempt for appearances," aestheticism.
In "place" of "excavat[ion]," boundaries—ecology—catch-and-release.
Here is a substantive conflict of values. Arguably it is one of the very most substantive such conflicts. Many of those which purport to be more substantive and urgent are (arguably!) in fact merely supervenient upon this one, right here. There is much to be said about this. Perhaps there is too much. For the moment it is enough merely to mark the occasion without (yet) marking the concepts.
Now, who are the enemies of love? Of healthy boundaries? No one at all, not in their own minds at least.
Of the concepts enumerated so far, "appearances" have by far the most and the most vicious enemies. The enemies of appearances (as well as the proponents) are most willing to own their beliefs, and to go to paper, often eloquently and profoundly. Of course this hardly exhausts the question, but perhaps it covers most of the relevant ground, already. Perhaps that is the whole thing, right there; and perhaps there really is nothing more to say about it. Perhaps.
As Sontag duly notes,
The most celebrated and influential modern doctrines, those of Marx and Freud, actually amount to elaborate systems of hermeneutics, aggressive and impious theories of interpretation.
These "modern doctrines" in fact originate in very powerful justifications for the practice of "aggressive excavation." In short: Human beings create illusions faster than they can dispell them; ergo, some countervailing practice of demystification is necessary; otherwise then illusion will reign supreme.
It would be beyond foolish to reject these particular premises in the course of the present work, to which these premises, as given, are in fact just as central as they are to Freudians and to Marxists. Philosophy also is concerned with (or else, it very well ought to be used for) more or less the same project of demystification. Demystification is a worthy and necessary project. Does Sontag really think it is unworthy and unnecessary?
Of course not. Her point seems to be, rather: If there is no illusion to demystify, then there is no need for any "modern doctrine" of demystification. That is the crucial unstated premise of her benediction. She was right to leave it unstated, so that those for whom it is anathema might show themselves in their very dissent.
What do these people "show" thereby? It is impossible to say with certainty, but there are a few obvious possibilities.
They may show that art is mystifying to them in a way that it is not to the commoner, although their "interpretations" arrive stamped with precisely the obverse belief.
Or,
more likely, they show that demystification is not actually their project. Demystification is not their value-orientation at all. Rather, there are "doctrines" afoot which posit demystification as a necessary practice, but it is the passagework of demystification and not its value-orientation which appeals to these people. They are mimes rather than classical actors. They gesture rather than speak. This is the "modern doctrine" of "hermeneutics" (interpretation) in capsule. Much is said, but to really understand the gesture is to understand what is done.
(Incidentally, it far easier to understand doings than to understand sayings. Actually is it comically simple and very nearly automatic. The hard part, for most people, seems to be the see-do distinction; this in spite of myriad well-worn pieces of folk wisdom on the matter, and in spite of myriad artifacts of the human sciences which have long since been popularized. The only internet memes which actually preserve the wisdom on which they are based have proven, also, shockingly easy to interpret self-interestedly. Here is yet another reason to be Against Interpretation.)
In other words, the value-orientation that motivates these actions is psychological, not sociological. This is not a misdeployment of terms: to identify the value-orientation which underwrites interpretation-as-demystification is to study the psyche of a psycholog; it is not to study the social life of a sociolog. The contingent social flux may determine which value-orientation is
explicitly stated
whenever interpreters arrogate (or are challenged) to justify the necessity of their practice in and to a society; still, interpreters are
born, not made.
They are activists first and intellectuals second. Their value-orientations
vis-a-vis
their practice of interpretation are
post facto
rationalizations, not prospective mandates. There is no reason to think that any of these value-orientations are coherent. The interpreters certainly provide no such reason, as hard as they try.
The reason why the relevant area of overlap between "hermentics" and "erotics" cannot be coaxed out of these concepts analytically is because it is not analytic to both of them; that is, as they are commonly construed. When "hermeneutics" is construed as the cognitive content of myriad works of interpretation, criticism, and the like, there is indeed no basis for replacing it with "erotics:" the construal-as-content is a full-stop value-orientation which "erotics" cannot be made to serve. It is, rather, the practice of "hermeneutics" and the practice of "erotics" which work similarly in (at least) one crucial respect.
The closest Sontag comes to hitting upon this is with the remark that "piety" (i.e. the "ancient" kind) in fact "may conceal an aggression"; this to contrast with the "open aggressiveness" and "contemporary zeal for the project of interpretation."
. . . "aggression" . . .
. . . "zeal" . . .
There is a cognitive-emotional valence to these terms, but they seem more apt to follow in the wake of a simple observation of observable behavior. Or perhaps it is more to the point to say that if there is no such behavior observed, then ascriptions such as these are about the subject, not about the object; i.e., they are projections. A "zeal for the project" is not quite this if it manifests no works. Aggressive thoughts or intentions are not quite "aggression" writ large; and manifest aggressive actions are no longer merely thoughts or intentions.
This is the right kind of concept to underwrite the replacement of one practice by another. (Cognitive content of works is precisely the wrong kind, for reasons which are best revealed elliptically.) e.g. Stipulate that interpretation works if it manifests "open aggressiveness." To generate a list of other practices that also do this is a matter of the simplest kind of empirical inquiry, the kind that anyone can do. The only difficulty is the simplicity: it is boring, bean-counting. But it is necessary actually to do it, and not to assume that the answer is obvious. The answer is as obvious upon observation as it only seems to be in imagination. It is easy to imagine that someone has aggressive intentions; it is just as easy to recognize aggressive actions; but the second of these avenues is far more reliable. If compliance with the value-orientation can be confirmed this way, empirically, without cognitivist "excavation," then the posited basis for re-"place"-ment has gained the advantage of coherence.
Now, stipulate that the value-orientation of "hermeneutics" is that it reveals hidden meaning. Hidden meaning is (definitionally) not manifest. It ceases to be hidden once it has been revealed.
[TBC...]
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